Abstract
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show that during World War II German leaders did not modify their strategy when the success of the Allied air offensive became manifest, and that their failure to change strategy was a major reason Germany was totally defeated.
First, this paper will describe the two main legs of the over-all German World War II strategy. The two main components were to fight on one front at a time and to fight quick, but intensive offensive campaigns. Then, the paper will demonstrate the German war strategy was consciously changed after it proved ineffective on the Russian front.
Third, the paper will explain that the Allied air offensive became the Second Front against Germany long before the 1944 Allied invasion of France. At that point, the paper will show that German leader's failure to anticipate the impact of the Allied air offensive and failure to modify German strategy were major reasons why Germany was finally defeated.
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The German Strategy
The overall German strategy in World War II sprang from their autocratic leader, Adolf Hitler, who made all major German decisions. 1 Of course, Germany, led by Hitler, was the aggressor. Hitler took the initiative in the beginning of the war, and in the first years of World War II in Europe, he picked the time and the place of the attacks.
Hitler was careful to avoid conflicts on more than one front at a time as he wanted to reduce the amount of resistance his forces would face. 2 Before the war, in his book Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote that Germany should not make the mistake of "making an enemy of the whole world" but that Germany must "recognize the most dangerous enemy" and then "hit him hard with her full concentrated power…" 3 Hitler told his generals several times that the main mistake Germany made in World War One was allowing "the development of a two-front war" and he promised them he would not make that mistake. 4 Hitler was careful to avoid a potential conflict on two fronts even before his invasion of Poland. For example, in the early 1930's Hitler calculated that Russia comprised a strong potential foe to Poland and therefore Poland would not attack Germany. 5 Nonetheless, in 1934, for added insurance, he negotiated a ten year peace treaty with Poland. 6 With little to fear from an attack from the east, the next year he turned his attention westward. He abrogated the military limitations on Germany and in 1936 he occupied the Rhineland. In August, 1939, Germany and Russia signed a non-aggression pact which insulated Germany, to some extent, from the likelihood of an immediate attack from Russia.
Concurrently with this, Hitler reinforced the Siegried line of fortifications along the western border of Germany. 7 Germany had little reason to fear significant military action on its western borders as both France and Britain had clearly demonstrated in the 1930s they would avoid being labeled the aggressor. 8 Militarily unprepared compared to Germany, there was little chance they would launch large scale assaults against the reinforced Siegfried line in 1939. 9 Hitler also calculated that the Siegfried line, backed up by a total of 23 German divisions, would have resisted major assaults. 10 Secure in the thought the only real actual opponent he would face was Poland, Hitler launched the invasion of Poland on 1
September 1939. Of course, this jolted France and Britain into reality and they declared war on Germany. After the defeat of Poland he boasted to his commanders "For the first time in 67 years it must be noted that we no longer have to conduct a war on two fronts…for the first time in history we have only to fight on one front." 11 As World War Two continued, Hitler maintained the strategy of avoiding a two front war.
Hitler did not want to face the US and Britain in the west while he was attempting to conquer European Russia. Therefore, he had the objective of neutralizing Britain in the west by "stripping Britain of its European allies." 12 At the least, Hitler felt if Britain lost its continental allies its ability to intervene significantly in continental matters would be greatly reduced. More important, Hitler hoped that the loss of allies would convince
Britain to sign a peace settlement. 13 Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, Germany encouraged Japanese hegemony in the Pacific. 14 Hitler felt that
Germany would have a difficult time winning a long war against "a coalition of major powers." 18 This was because of the larger population that foes could, over time, bring to bear against Germany 19 and that as time went on, neutral countries could go over to the enemy side. 20 These neutrals could contribute resources and manpower to the enemy coalition. Therefore, Hitler did not want to risk a repeat of the World War I war of attrition. At the same time, to avoid a war of attrition he wanted to attack at the time and place of his choosing, with locally superior force so that victory was guaranteed. His forces would be limited in size, but efficient, flexible, fast, and led by very capable commanders.
The Germans wanted to shatter an enemy's cohesion, organization, and psychological strengths using strength against selected weakness, and using speed and surprise. The Germans did not want the war to transition to a war of attrition, where victory depended less on military competence but more on quantitative superiority.
Hitler felt confident his one front and blitzkrieg strategy would propel Germany to a major military and political power, Initially, he was correct: in the first phase of the war In late 1941, many of Hitler's generals and ministers understood the opportunity to defeat Russia quickly was now gone and they advised Hitler to withdraw to defensive lines to the West. 9 Based on comments he made to subordinates and to the public, Hitler understood the initiative was shifting to the Russians. 10 The clear historical evidence is the defeat at the gates of Moscow influenced Hitler to change the German strategy of a lightning war.
By January 1942, Hitler realized his strategy of a short war was unsound and he recast German strategy away from the blitzkrieg strategy to a strategy of attrition warfare.
On 10 January 1942 he signed an order which directed the restructuring of the armaments industry for increased production and which directed that "all available raw materials"
were to be channeled into weapons factories so that increased amounts of war material could be produced. 11 These orders mark the end of the blitzkrieg strategy. In February,
1942, Hitler turned to other measures which pointed to the end of the blitzkrieg strategy-he mobilized the entire economy for war, increased the numbers of men drafted, ordered large increases in military production and directed that "peacetime planning and developments were to be suspended at once in all firms."
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At least one source postulates that the increased Allied air raids were part of the reason Hitler moved to an attrition strategy. 13 Others point out to the fact that Pearl
Harbor had occurred by this time, and that Germany had declared war on the US. 14 In fact, Hitler's order of 10 January 1942 specifically pointed out the armament and munitions needs on the Russian Front. 17 Further, since this order mandated that the German army's armament programs were to receive priority, it would seem that Allied air power was not one of Hitler's chief concern in early 1942. 18 On top of that, when both the armament industries and the German army needed additional manpower, Hitler directed more manpower be allocated to the army so the Russian front could be stabilized. 19 These actions certainly indicate the Russia front influenced him more than concern over US industrial capability or thoughts of an Allied air offensive. 
The Allied Air Offensive
The Anglo-American coalition's plans for a strategic air offensive against Germany were long-standing. By the late 1930's both Britain and the US gave high priority for preparing for a strategic bombing offensive. There is clear documentation of very comprehensive plans for a British strategic air offensive as far back as 1937, when the "Western Air Plans" were published. The objectives of these British plans included key industrial targets such as the synthetic oil industry and plans for attacking the morale of the enemy population. 1 Although not yet directly involved in the war, by 1940 the American Army Air Corps was preparing plans to launch air attacks on key German industrial targets in order to crush the ability of Germany to wage war. 2 While both Britain and the US developed separately the goal of the destruction of the German industrial base, the specific plans to do this were formally merged at the secretly held ABC conference.
In 1940, in accordance with his belief in the importance of preparing for conflict while trying not to be involved directly in WWII, President Roosevelt approved the proposal for a secret conference. This conference convened British and US military planning staffs in Washington, D.C. to make proposals on combined US/British strategy and plans. The conference was held from January to March 1941-many months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 3 The planning staffs produced a report, known as ABC-1, which had several key points. Among them was this provision: "There will be a sustained air offensive against both Germany and other regions under enemy control that contribute to German military power." 4 In May 1941, by direction of a joint-planning organization, the joint Army-Navy Board, the Conference's policies began to be assimilated into US war plans. 5 The overall strategy and objectives contained in the ABC-1 Report were formally endorsed by the President of the US on 9 July, 1941. 6 The first actual "blows" of the Allied Air Campaign can be traced to May 1940, when Britain first bombed Germany. 7 Since Britain could not bring significant ground forces directly against Germany, air power was one way to put sustained pressure on This Allied air offensive against Germany caused the Germans to dedicate large amounts of resources to defending against the offensive. Additionally, the Allied air offensive caused massive reductions in German war production.
Due to the pressures of the air offense, by the end of 1943 there were over 55,000
anti-aircraft guns deployed throughout Germany. 13 Over seventy-five percent of these guns were the dual purpose anti-air and anti-tank 88 millimeter gun which had proved very effective against Russian tanks. 14 The German minister of armaments production, Albert Speer, pointed out "the same guns could well have been employed in Russia against tanks…" 15 By early 1944, over 800,000 Germans were dedicated to air defense in the west and a million Germans were working to repair damage caused by the air offensive. 16 Thirty-three percent of the German optics industry was producing gunsights for anti-aircraft guns which caused shortages of optical gunsights for front-line ground troops. 17 Speer has pointed out that Germany could have formed and equipped 60 divisions with the men and resources committed to bomber defense, and that these forces could have changed the outcome either on the Russian front or in the West. 18 In an Other important industrial products were also very heavily impacted. By the spring of 1945, production of nitrogen, a key component in the manufacture of explosives, was cut to just nine per cent of its spring, 1944 production. 21 This resulted in very limited
German ammunition production just as the Allies were poised to invade the German homeland from both the east and west. To make matters worse for the Germans, their high octane airplane fuel production had virtually ended due to attacks on synthetic fuel factories. 22 They could only launch occasional aircraft sorties, and they had almost no fuel to train new pilots. On the ground, most of their tanks and trucks were inoperable due to lack of fuel. Overall fuel production in early 1945 was only twelve per cent of the February, 1944 production. 23 Without a doubt, the Allied air power strategy was a success.
The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys conducted by the US military after
World War II stated "Allied Air Power was decisive in the war in western Europe." 24 Clearly, the Allied air offensive was a second front-a front Hitler did not anticipate.
Notes

A Disaster Unforeseen
By mid 1942, soon after Hitler had modified his strategy to a war of attrition, the potential effects of the Allied air offensive should have been clear. Not only had the RAF slowly increased the level of bombing over occupied Europe and Germany, but the Allied strategy for a massive air offensive and the projected production figures of US aircraft were openly written about by correspondents.
During 1941 the increased intensity of Allied air attacks was significant. For example, by November 1941, the RAF had an average of over 500 bombers and crews available each night to attack various targets. 1 Most targets were area attacks on cities while some attempts were made for precision bombing attacks on plants that processed oil, and rubber and on electrical power plants. 2 In March, 1942, the RAF concentrated most of its long range bombers for a strike on a German city. In what should have been a "wake up" call to the Germans, Lubeck was bombed by almost 250 RAF bombers.
Almost half of the central part of the city, over 200 acres, was destroyed. 3 Soon after that, in May, 1942, the RAF bombed Cologne with over 1,000 bombers. At the time it was the largest air attack in history, 4 and the fact that over 1,000 bombers were employed was well publicized. 5 Still, after the Cologne attack, the German leadership did not reevaluate overall strategy. Rather than a strategic reappraisal, Hitler ordered retaliatory bombing raids against British cities, and condemned the Luftwaffe for failing to shoot down all the Allied bombers. 6 During 1942, the RAF not only increased the number of bomber aircraft available for missions but phased out slower, less capable models in favor of more capable aircraft. 7 Additionally, the US Army Air Force ( AAF ) build-up began in Britain in 1942. By late 1942, the US AAF could only launch a maximum of a little more than 100 bombers a day against targets in occupied Europe. 8 Nonetheless, almost all the bombers used by the US were large, four-engine bombers and its bomber capabilities in Britain were steadily rising. Therefore, it should have been clear to Hitler and his advisors that the US AAF would soon be a major force that would have to be reckoned with.
The ever-increasing Allied attacks on Germany and on German occupied countries were direct evidence of the potential of an air offensive. To limit the effectiveness of Moreover, the quality of the resources deployed to the West for air defense was much better than resources deployed elsewhere.
Significantly, the best German fighter pilots were assigned to the Western air defense squadrons. Moreover, when additional aircraft were sent to the Western air defense units they were always new variants of existing fighter designs while older, less capable fighter models went to the Russian front or to the Mediterranean theater. 10 The ever A major part of US strategy was an air offensive, so the document detailed the plan for bombing Germany, including a detailed listing of overall objectives, targets, and aircraft production requirements. The strategic plan also called for large-scale combined air, sea, and land British/US offensives against Germany starting in 1943. This document was leaked to newspapers who supported isolationist policies. 12 The newspapers completely exposed the Victory Program in early December, 1941, presumably to paint FDR as planning war. 13 The entire transcript of the stories about the Victory Plan was cabled from the German Embassy to Berlin. These cables, understandably, triggered a series of German studies. Hitler's staff concluded it would be possible for the US to produce the war material for the planned "Victory " Program within the time-frame the plan outlined.
During the time frame of 5 to 14 December Hitler was briefed on the Victory Program, his staff's studies about the Program, and their recommendation that a major German strategy revision was required in order to defeat the objectives of the Allies. 14 Even with all the information available concerning the on-going and planned air offensive Hitler did not revise German strategy. 15 Hitler stuck to the war strategy predicated on fighting on one front at a time.
On the other hand, as already discussed, Hitler did make significant changes in strategy if he felt they were warranted. Due to changing conditions on the Russian front, there would be no Allied offensive at that time. After the Victory Documents were leaked to the US media, Hitler did not accept his staff's recommendations for a revised strategy because he simply believed Japanese military action would "tie down" the US until some years after 1943. 19 After the War, Goering testified that Hitler used his intuition to reach the conclusion that "the major brunt of US forces would be to bear on the Far East and would not constitute a danger for Germany." 20 Without a doubt, Hitler greatly underestimated US industrial capabilities and "assumed away" probable Allied courses of action. 21 In addition to minimizing future enemy capabilities and intentions,
Hitler believed the future would be like the past. That is, since strategic bombing had been ineffective in the past, Hitler believed it would also be in the future.
There were many reasons that Hitler did not appreciate the potential for strategic bombing. One reason was Hitler misapplied the example of the Luftwaffe's inability to cripple Britain via bombing in 1940 and 1941. 22 Hitler felt the Allied Air forces would have the same general experience in strategic bombing that the Luftwaffe had experienced. Of course, the Luftwaffe, in numbers and capabilities of aircraft, and in doctrine, were not prepared for a strategic bombing offensive. 23 The early portion of the Allied air offensive reinforced the concept that effects of aerial bombing would be limited by air defenses. While Allied air raids increased in size and number in 1941 and 1942, relatively speaking, the numbers and volume of attacks were not high. The limited sizes of the raids, the unsophisticated tactics of the Allied air crews and the German air defenses generally kept damage from the raids manageable. As long as bomb damage was not "excessive," and so long as enemy sorties were not above 100 per day, Hitler viewed his air defense as adequate. 24 Over all, Hitler judged the early attacks of the Allied air offensive to be more of a nuisance than anything else.
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However, by late 1942, there was considerable evidence that the Allied air offensive was building toward a second front and that, consequently, the German strategy of a one front war was losing validity. Even Hitler, focused heavily on events in Russia, considered briefly the possibility of a second front in the air. After the RAF's 1,000 plane raid on Cologne in May, 1942, Hitler pointed out to his staff that these attacks were designed to "establish an aerial second front" 26 However, as previously shown, Hitler's under-appreciation of Allied potential along with his regard for German air defenses led
Results
As previously discussed, the Allied air offensive did become the second front. This second front, combined with Hitler not modifying German strategy, had several operational and strategic impacts on the Germans. Operationally, the Germans did not have adequate numbers and types of fighter aircraft and the trained crews to operate them -soon the Luftwaffe defenses were swamped. 1 Also, at the operational level, by 1943, the Allied air offensive "pulled" large numbers of German aircraft and crews from the Russian front. 2 The Allied bomber offensive was putting so much pressure on German defenses and causing so much damage to German industry that aircraft had to be moved from the Russian front to aid in defense of Germany. This re-deployment of aircraft had a major negative impact on ground operations on the Russian front. As the war went on, the Russian army gained qualitative and quantitative parity with, or superiority over the German army. The Germans were using the effective ground attack and anti-tank capabilities of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft to stem Russian advances until the army could close the gaps. 3 By summer of 1943, due to a shortage of aircraft, the Germans could not develop air superiority over even localized areas on the Russian front. 4 Needless to say, this loss of air superiority had major negative impacts on the combat effectiveness of the German Army. Back in the German homeland, industries lost potential production because they had to adjust to the bombings. They did this by replacing destroyed facilities, using alternative methods of transportation, dispersing production lines, and by moving production facilities into caves or other hardened facilities. Even considering the effects of the bombings, Speer's reforms brought increased efficiency and greatly increased armament production. Still, he has emphasized in his writings and in interviews that, considering all categories of arms, Allied bombings cut potential armament production by 28% in the critical period of late 1943. Even more important, military aircraft production was cut 30%, and tank production was cut 36% during this period.
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This was a critical time for Germany because she was desperately fighting to maintain control over her airspace 6 and was attempting to stabilize the eastern front after the disastrous German defeat at Kursk. 7 As is well known, conditions only got much worse for the German war effort. By early 1945, due to Allied air power, German industry was experiencing shortages of raw material. At the same time, destruction of the German railroads and canals meant that only a small amount of the completed armaments could be moved to the front. Still, even with all the effects of the bombing, fuel turned out to be the Achilles tendon of the Germans. Eventually, the bombing of the synthetic fuel plants-essentially petroleum refinery facilities which could not be feasibly moved underground-essentially ended German fuel production. 8 This halted the mechanized German war machines and was a major factor in the final defeat of Germany.
Clearly, there were many direct and indirect effects of the Allied bombing campaign-a campaign that was actually the second front. These effects include the transfer of key units from the Russian front, the virtual end of German fuel production, and the massive division of manpower from offensive combat to air defense duties.
While these impacts were significant, there was a more important and more basic result of Hitler not properly evaluating the potential of an aerial second front and modifying German strategy. In the overall strategic sense, the Allied air offensive meant that
Germany was faced with a two front war. Unfortunately for Germany, her military plans and doctrine were designed around a one front war. Additionally, her resources were not capable of sustaining a long war on two fronts. 9 Without a modification of German By this time Stalin's forces were so superior to Hitler's there was no incentive for Stalin to reach a negotiated settlement. 23 Along the same lines, fairly late in the War, Hitler tried to emphasize air defense but time and resources ran out before new weapons could regain air superiority.
The above discussion of strategies is not designed to be an in-depth description of all the strategies available to Hitler and their potential advantages and disadvantages. There is little doubt the reader can outline other potential German strategies. The point of the above examples is to show there were strategic options available to Hitler-options other than carrying out a flawed one-front strategy. Needless to say, the key was for Hitler to re-assess German strategy early enough so that he was able to implement other options.
Of course, Hitler did not do this.
Notes
Conclusions
At the beginning of WWII the German strategy was a one-front, blitzkrieg strategy.
Hitler had considerable success concentrating on one front and carrying out intensive offensives in order to shatter enemy defenses. The Russians, unexpectedly for Hitler, survived the Nazi invasion which was launched in June, 1941. At this point, Hitler was not a slave to the strategy; he modified the blitzkrieg strategy in early 1942 to one of attrition warfare.
Concurrently, the Allies adopted an air offensive against Nazi Germany as a major part of US/British strategy. This offensive grew slowly, but in May 1942, the RAF was launching attacks by over 1,000 bombers at a time. US assistance to the Allied air campaign was very limited in the year after Pearl Harbor, but there were strong indications that a substantial Allied air offensive was going to be unleashed against Germany. Hitler did not properly assess the information available to him and determined the Allied air offensive would not be a serious threat. Hitler, rather than being prudent and over-estimating enemy capabilities, underestimated them. Without a realistic appraisal of the situation he had no basis to modify the one front strategy. However, as
we have seen, the air offensive relatively quickly became the second front. The Allied air offensive played a major role in defeating Hitler. Similarly, Hitler's failure to respond to changing conditions was another major factor in Germany's defeat. Hitler did not adjust his strategy but maintained the adjusted strategy of attrition warfare on one front. As the Allied air offensive grew, the Allies exploited German weaknesses. Hitler's one front strategy meant Germany was not able to adequately combat the second front-the Allied air offensive while fighting the Russians on the East.
The lessons for us today are clear. If involved in a conflict, do not underestimate the enemy and constantly reassess the enemy's potential strategy and capability. Try to maintain the initiative. Carefully craft a strategy and options for courses of action if conditions change. Above all, stick to strategy if it is in our own best interests, but also be prepared to change the strategy if a modification is in our best interests. For example, if conditions change, our strategies may also have to change. As President Franklin D.
Roosevelt said: "Hitler built a fortress around Europe, but he forgot to put a roof on it." 1 We must insure that US strategy has sides, a floor, and a roof-no matter how significantly the environment changes.
Notes
